IDAC’s Blurred Lines of Accountability Entrenching Political Manipulation

Dr. Reneva Fourie

Over the past few days, the Madlanga Commission, established by President Cyril Ramaphosa in 2025 to investigate alleged collusion between criminal syndicates and certain politicians, police officials and prosecutors, has focused on the Investigating Directorate Against Corruption (IDAC). 

Although the commission has not yet reached any findings, the proceedings have highlighted significant institutional concerns. Allegations suggest that senior IDAC leadership may have unduly interfered with investigations, that investigations and prosecutions may have been selective, and that the organisation faces internal leadership challenges.

Tensions and overlapping mandates among IDAC, the Hawks, SAPS Crime Intelligence, and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) have also surfaced. Since the NPA's oversight of IDAC is limited to administrative matters, the key governance issue is determining who holds operational accountability for IDAC.

IDAC was established in 2019 as a temporary entity to investigate issues related to state capture. In 2024, it became a permanent, multidisciplinary body with full policing powers under the National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act. Its mandate is to investigate and prosecute serious, high-profile, and complex corruption and commercial and financial crimes.

The expansion of its powers has elevated its importance within South Africa's criminal justice system, making clarity regarding its institutional position and accountability all the more significant.

IDAC's evolution coincided with the development of a high-level partnership between government and organised business through the Business for South Africa (B4SA) platform. Initiated by President Ramaphosa in 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, B4SA expanded in 2023 into a broader public governance initiative.

Its main workstreams include energy, transport and logistics (in collaboration with Operation Vulindlela), youth employment, and crime and corruption. These workstreams report to a unified Joint Strategic Operations Committee within the Presidency, which coordinates over 115 corporate chief executives and government ministries.

The Joint Initiative to Fight Crime and Corruption (JICC) leads the crime and corruption workstream, serving as a strategic coordination mechanism that combines public and private resources, expertise, and intelligence to address organised crime and systemic corruption.

This includes contributions from forensic accountants, data analysts, digital tools, investigators and other specialists. The JICC complements the public sector, which faces budget constraints, skill shortages and procurement delays.

Business plays a vital role in combating crime and corruption by providing expertise, resources and specialist capabilities that can strengthen state investigations. However, governance risks arise when business leaders oversee state structures influencing investigations and have full access to intelligence.

Merging state authority and classified intelligence with private interests can undermine state sovereignty, judicial impartiality and public trust if safeguards and accountability mechanisms are not clearly defined.

Even if JICC members act with full integrity, the institutional design may still create perceptions of conflict of interest. It can suggest privileged access to government and intelligence structures, raising concerns that investigative priorities or regulatory enforcement could favour certain companies or sectors.

Public confidence in criminal justice institutions relies on individual integrity as well as independent and transparent governance arrangements.

South Africa is particularly vulnerable to these concerns given its experience of State Capture, during which a small group of public and private actors influenced state decision-making to extract private benefit while imposing social and economic costs on the broader population.

The findings of the Zondo Commission illustrate the consequences of weak institutional safeguards. More recently, allegations that Tony Leon lobbied Democratic Alliance ministers to advance particular business interests have again highlighted the sensitivity surrounding the relationship between political authority and private interests.

Regardless of the merits of those allegations, South Africa's recent history demonstrates the importance of governance arrangements that maintain a clear separation between public authority and private interests.

These concerns extend beyond questions of perception. Where private actors have access to state intelligence, risks arise relating to the protection of classified information, operational security and the integrity of investigative processes.

Equally important is democratic accountability. Private business leaders are accountable to shareholders, boards and corporate governance structures, rather than to Parliament or the electorate.

Where they occupy positions that influence the exercise of state coercive powers, governance arrangements must ensure that operational authority, access to intelligence and accountability are clearly defined.

Without such clarity, it becomes difficult for Parliament and the public to determine where responsibility for operational decisions ultimately resides, potentially undermining confidence in the legitimacy and independence of state institutions.

Given this context, the central issue is IDAC's operational accountability. The Presidency appoints the Head of IDAC, and the JICC, which works closely with IDAC, is also based within the Presidency.

The foreign and domestic intelligence services, as well as the National Centre for Intelligence Coordination, are similarly situated. Although this structure is not unique internationally, recent allegations of political interference in South Africa's law enforcement institutions make transparency about IDAC's operational accountability essential. IDAC's newness and critical mandate require clear governance to maintain its credibility.

IDAC's future credibility rests on three principles.

First, its statutory mandate must be precise, leaving little uncertainty about its jurisdiction compared to other investigative bodies.

Second, its operational parameters should clearly define its relationship with the Hawks, SAPS Crime Intelligence, the NPA, and any external coordinating structures.

Third, and most importantly, its operational accountability must be clearly established.

The key questions are who exercises operational oversight, who reviews operational decisions, and through which constitutional mechanisms these decisions are scrutinised.

IDAC must operate without undue political or commercial influence. The issues it raises should not be dismissed due to unclear mandates or reporting lines. Allegations involving Crime Intelligence head Lieutenant General Dumisani Khumalo and Lieutenant General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi should be investigated thoroughly, independently, and in line with due process.

Those making allegations must provide evidence for proper scrutiny, while those accused deserve a fair opportunity to respond and, where appropriate, clear their names. The integrity of the investigative process is inseparable from that of the institutions involved.

South Africa requires an anti-corruption agency that is independent, professionally competent, and publicly trusted. The recent creation of the IDAC Ombud, led by retired Judge Takalani Joseph Raulinga, under Section 22A of the National Prosecuting Authority Act (as inserted by the 2024 Amendment Act), is a positive step toward greater institutional accountability.

While the Ombud is likely to enhance accountability and public confidence, it does not resolve the central issue of IDAC's operational accountability within South Africa's law enforcement and governance framework. IDAC’s long-term legitimacy depends on a constitutionally grounded mandate and a clear accountability chain.

* Dr Reneva Fourie is a policy analyst specialising in governance, development and security.

** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.