Political Elite's Flirtation with Organised Crime Undermining Democracy

Dr. Reneva Fourie

South Africa’s history of anti-apartheid resistance commanded worldwide admiration.

This admiration is being increasingly eroded. The Madlanga Commission hearings are revealing the troubling proximity of political figures to the darker sides of the criminal underworld. It may be easier to understand how service providers and corrupt officials came to intersect. But it is difficult to grasp how highly organised criminal syndicates have ingratiated themselves into the very core of the country’s political authorities.

The revelations arising from the Madlanga Commission, though still to be tested, are appalling and profoundly dispiriting.

Yet history cautions that intimate ties between politics and criminality are neither novel nor uniquely South African. The practice is transnational and entrenched. It rests on the perilous exchange of patronage and protection, facilitated by the permeability of political systems and the moral erosion of those entrusted with public office.

The story of Pablo Escobar and the Medellín Cartel illustrates this dynamic. Escobar’s power rested not only on violence and cocaine profits but on his ability to buy influence in political circles. His brief stint in Colombian politics was not an aberration. It was a strategy. By wearing the garb of legitimacy, he shielded his criminal empire from scrutiny.

The tragedy of Colombia during those years shows what happens when the line between political authority and organised crime becomes blurred. The results were assassinations, widespread corruption, and the erosion of democratic institutions.

The work Italian Mafias Today: Territory, Business and Politics demonstrates the sophisticated integration between the legal economy, entrenched control over territory, and the symbiotic relationships between criminal networks, political parties, and state institutions.

The book illustrates how criminal entities infiltrate democratic systems, masquerading as legitimate economic actors while exploiting every loophole for profit. The lessons from Italy are sobering. Once such networks are entrenched, they are extraordinarily difficult to dismantle.

Europol’s assessments on contemporary mafias underline the global scope of the threat. Cosa Nostra money launderers are among the most dexterous financial operators in the world. They construct elaborate corporate structures that manoeuvre themselves into national economies. Their reach extends to South Africa, Canada, Spain, and the United States.

The ’Ndrangheta is even more widely diffused, with a presence across Europe, North America, South America, and Australia. Europol concludes that all major mafia groups cultivate a parasitic relationship with the state. They infiltrate political systems and economic sectors with devastating effectiveness. They thrive on weaknesses in regulation, fragmented enforcement, and political complicity.

In The Rise and Fall of Organized Crime in the United States, James B Jacobs details the complex relationships between the Cosa Nostra and various groups, including businesspeople, politicians, law enforcement agencies, and civil servants.

The narrative is one of complicity, where individuals within state systems choose to prioritise their own interests over upholding the rule of law. The history of organised crime in the United States reveals a cycle that is recognisable in other countries. When politicians become dependent on illicit funds and state officials become complicit in wrongdoing, the system itself becomes corrupted.

The Epstein case, still unfolding, provides a contemporary example. Investigations have revealed that high-profile politicians were linked to extensive use of offshore companies, nominee accounts, and complex financial arrangements. These arrangements could have been used for money laundering, for hiding payments, and possibly for sex trafficking.

While the case is distinct from traditional mafia structures, the methods are familiar. Networks of secrecy, financial manipulation, and political influence create spaces where criminality can thrive with impunity.

South Africa’s history shows that these patterns are not new. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission revealed the existence of Delta G. This structure was set up by the apartheid Special Operations unit with the express purpose of supplying illegal drugs in an attempt to counter anti-apartheid activism. The collaboration with criminal networks to distribute drugs as a political weapon was devastating to communities, and their traces remain visible today.

More recently, the Zondo Commission provided significant insights into public sector corruption. It demonstrated how procurement systems and state-owned entities were manipulated for the enrichment of a few. But the Madlanga Commission is highlighting even deeper links between criminal networks, the state, and the economy.

While the veracity of the allegations still needs to be tested, the evidence of entrenched networks is compelling. In the local government sphere, these networks, which not only implicate one political party, have been well-documented. They show how service delivery falters when municipal systems are captured by criminals and resources are diverted.

The implications are profound. The lessons from other countries are also clear. They remind us that organised crime and corruption are not aberrations. They are systemic afflictions that corrode democracy from within. They are challenges that threaten the very foundation of democracy.

They reveal the fragility of state institutions when leaders fail to uphold the highest ethical standards. They show that when governance is compromised by criminality, the state becomes a tool for private gain rather than a guardian of public good. Where governance is weak, crime becomes embedded. Where governance is strong, crime is contained.

What is urgently needed is clean governance. Clean governance is not an abstract ideal. It is the lifeblood of democracy. It is the guarantee that resources are used for the benefit of the people. It is the assurance that the police will serve communities rather than protect criminal syndicates.

It is the promise that public representatives will uphold the Constitution and not the interests of clandestine networks. Clean governance requires integrity, transparency, and accountability in every sphere of government.

A harsher fight against crime and corruption is equally necessary. This fight must be relentless. It must involve strengthening investigative capacity, protecting whistle-blowers, reforming procurement processes, and ensuring that prosecutions are swift and decisive. It requires collaboration between state institutions, civil society, and international partners. 

The path forward is one of integrity and resilience. Without clean governance and a resolute offensive against crime and corruption, the promise of democracy risks becoming hostage to those who profit from its betrayal.

* Dr Reneva Fourie is a policy analyst specialising in governance, development, and security.

** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL, Independent Media or The African.