Washington Agreement masks complex regional dynamics

Dr. Sizo Nkala

Earlier this year, the DRC President Felix Tshisekedi reached out to US President Donald Trump for security assistance in the form of training and equipment supplies for his forces to enable them to push back the rebel advance in North and South Kivu provinces.

In return, US companies would get exclusive access to the DRC’s abundant reserves of critical minerals such as cobalt, coltan, lithium and tantalum, among others, which are important for the US industrial competitiveness and technological dominance. This overture led to the Trump administration’s active mediation of the conflict involving Rwanda and the DRC, culminating in a peace agreement signed by the two countries on the 27th of June in Washington, DC, United States.

Mediated by the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, the deal seeks to end the deadly conflict in eastern DRC that has been raging for decades and has put the two countries at loggerheads. The United Nations and the DRC government have claimed that Rwanda has not only been funding the biggest rebel group in eastern DRC, the M23, but also has up to 4000 soldiers fighting alongside the M23.

While Rwandan President Paul Kagame has denied the allegations, he has described Rwanda’s involvement in the DRC debacle as “defensive measures”. On its part, Rwanda has accused the DRC government of funding and arming the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) – a militia group made up of members of the Hutu ethnic group, accused of participating in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

The goal of the FDLR is to topple the Kagame regime, which hounded them out of the country when it took power in 1994. The peace deal comes amidst the escalation of the conflict, which has seen the M23 rebels capturing major cities and airports in Congo’s North and South Kivu provinces in recent months. The group is also helping itself to the lucrative critical minerals like cobalt, coltan, and lithium found in huge deposits in some of the areas it has captured.Several key commitments were made in the peace agreement.

Firstly, under the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, both countries agreed to implement the Harmonised Plan Neutralisation of the FDLR and Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda, which they agreed to in October 2024 under the auspices of the Luanda Process mediated by the Angolan President Joao Lourenco.

This is a tacit admission by both parties that they have been supporting non-state forces to counter each other. Concerning Rwanda, the phrase ‘disengagement of forces’ may be referring to the alleged presence of members of the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) fighting alongside the M23.

Secondly, they agreed to a ceasefire by refraining from any acts of aggression against each other, resolving their differences peacefully through the dispute resolution mechanism established by the agreement, and restraining or withdrawing support for armed groups in their territories. This ceasefire already seems to be shaky as the fighting has reportedly continued even after the signing of the deal.

Thirdly and crucially, the parties committed to the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of the members of non-state armed groups into the community and the DRC security forces, including the army and the police. This will be a test for the Washington Agreement, as previous peace agreements – the Pretoria Agreement of 2002 and the Nairobi Agreement in 2013 – have collapsed because of the failure to disarm and reintegrate members of the rebel groups. 

Further, DRC and Rwanda agreed to set up a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism within 30 days, which will monitor and verify the withdrawal of support for and the disbandment of rebel groups. The safe return of refugees to their countries, the return of internally displaced people to their homes and the opening up of a humanitarian corridor were also among the commitments made by the two parties.

Importantly, the agreement also enjoined Rwanda and the DRC to jointly produce a regional integration economic framework within three months to, among other things, promote investment and trade in critical mineral supply chains and block the illicit flow of minerals. The framework will promote bilateral economic cooperation, including joint work on “formalised end-to-end mineral value chains (from mine to processed metal) that link both countries, in partnership, as appropriate, with the U.S. government and U.S. investors”.

Finally, the agreement established the Joint Oversight Committee, made up of the African Union facilitators, the US, and Qatar, to help resolve differences and complaints in the implementation of the agreement.

However, the published part of the agreement does not reveal anything about the US commitments to military assistance for the DRC. Just like his minerals for security deal with Ukraine earlier this year, it seems Trump has dodged making any security guarantees to the DRC.

The agreement demands that the DRC create a safe investment environment first to pave the way for US investment. But the DRC does not have the capacity to address the security situation without direct assistance from the US.

What is needed in the DRC is state-building, which the agreement does not address. If its dismal misadventures in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya are anything to go by, the US is clueless when it comes to state-building in foreign countries. Further, the enforcement of the agreement is placed on the laps of the DRC and Rwanda – two countries that share mutual distrust. It takes no genius to see that their leaders working together in good faith on such delicate issues as disarmament and demobilisation is almost impossible at the moment. 

Another key weakness of the agreement is that it excludes the rebel groups, particularly the M23, which is the most potent and primary military actor in eastern DRC. The group’s leaders have already said they will not be bound to an agreement they are not part of. Without the buy-in of the M23 and other rebel groups, a ceasefire, as demanded by the agreement, will not be possible.

There have been many ceasefire agreements previously that were invariably honoured in the breach. This agreement does not provide any special safeguards to ensure that the ceasefire will hold. Neither were representatives of civil society organisations, and the various ethnic groups found in the DRC included in the negotiations, which makes the agreement feel like a shallow elite pact devoid of legitimacy.

Moreover, the agreement is asking Rwanda to give up the significant financial benefits it derives from the illicit mining and trafficking of critical minerals in areas held by its proxy, the M23. While Kigali has argued that its involvement in the DRC is primarily to contain the FDLR rebels, this is an incomplete explanation. The country draws a significant amount of revenue from the illegal mining and export of critical minerals from eastern DRC.

The Washington Agreement, through the envisaged regional economic integration framework, which seeks to end illicit mineral trafficking, is effectively asking Rwanda to give up its lunch. It is a no-brainer that Kigali will not wholeheartedly do that.

* Dr. Sizo Nkala is a Research Fellow at the University of Johannesburg’s Centre for Africa-China Studies.

** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL, Independent Media or The African.