The Legacy of State Capture: ANC's Struggle with Corruption and Trust

Prof. Bheki Mngomezulu

Advocate Thuli Madonsela made history when she penned report No. 6 of 2016/17 titled “The state of capture”, which has since been referred to as “State Capture”. This was an investigation into alleged improper and unethical conduct by then-President Jacob Zuma and other state functionaries relating to what was said to be improper involvement of the Gupta family in the removal and appointment of Ministers and Directors of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs).

Penning the Executive Summary, Madonsela stated that “State of Capture” is my report in terms of section 182(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, and section 3(1) of the Executive Members Ethics Act and section 8(1) of the Public Protector Act, 1994.”

The sections cited by Madonsela were relevant. They demonstrated her understanding of the Constitutional imperative which guided her in executing her mandate.

However, there was a concern that section 84(f) of the Constitution was flouted when Madonsela recommended that the Chairperson of the commission should be appointed by the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, not the sitting President.

Section 84 talks about the powers and functions of a sitting President. Section 84(f) states that the President is responsible for “appointing commissions of inquiry.” It does not envisage a situation whereby the chairperson of the commission should be appointed by someone else. Anyway, that is a discussion for the legal fraternity, especially those who specialise in Constitutional Law.

What is of interest in this article is to reflect on the report. Madonsela submitted it, yet not all her recommendations have been implemented. The question is, why?    

Almost ten years down the line, a few questions arise which might shed light on the question above. Firstly, was there the capture of the state by then President Zuma and other functionaries, or was this a political ploy to hide the reality by tarnishing his public image? Secondly, did the Gupta family come into the picture only in 2009 when Zuma ascended to the Presidency of the country? If they were already there, what role did they play in the ANC, in government and SOEs? 

Thirdly, with the Guptas having left the country, did corruption end in South Africa, in the ANC and government? Fourthly, if there was a “state of capture”, why has prosecution taken a snail’s pace, and what role does the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) play? Fifthly and lastly, will the ANC succeed in ridding itself of the impact of corruption and trust deficit between itself and the electorate as discussed in Madonsela’s report?

Regarding the first question, it depends on who provides the answer. To some, the answer is in the affirmative. They usually cite incidents such as the Nkandla gate. However, they fail to acknowledge that Zuma was already renovating his home using Minenhle Makhanya as his architect. They also overlook the role played by the security cluster, which was responsible for installing security features at Zuma’s home.

Fikile Mbalula, the current Secretary-General of the ANC, is on record saying that the ANC deliberately lied to the nation when it instructed Nathi Nhleko to state that the swimming pool at Zuma’s homestead was a fire pool. The question is: how many other lies were manufactured behind closed doors? Did the Guptas have anything to do with that?

These questions lead to the view shared by some that there was never any capture of the state by a few. There was corruption then as there is corruption now!

On the second question, there is no debate that Zuma found the Guptas already embedded in the ANC. His predecessors interacted with this family in different contexts. Perhaps what changed under Zuma is that the Gupta brothers were more influential in making certain decisions. Surely, some of the allegations made against them remain just that – allegations, because they never presented their side of the story.

The answer to the third question is an emphatic no! South Africa is not free from corruption, long after Madonsela’s report was submitted. Even President Cyril Ramaphosa promised “The New Dawn” and to correct the wrongs of the so-called “nine wasted years” under Zuma, whom he deputised both in the ANC and in government. The Phala Phala matter made a mockery of the President’s promise to end corruption. Although state institutions cleared him of any wrongdoing, the stigma remains. Nationally, statistics paint a bleak picture about ending corruption.

The fourth question is even more important. Some money has been recovered, which is good. The NPA has understandably claimed victories. But it would be foolhardy to praise the fish for swimming. The NPA staff did what is expected of them. There is still more work to be done. Sadly, in some instances, the accusations do not seem to stick. This raises questions on whether there were cases against certain individuals in the first place or if there was character assassination for political expediency.

The last question talks to the ANC, which has been the governing party since 1994 until May 2024. Historically, it is in the culture of the ANC to embrace ‘collective responsibility’. It was intriguing when, suddenly, some ANC members (including those in leadership positions) claimed innocence or told the Zondo Commission that they were scared to stop corruption. This was a lame excuse.

Whatever happened has tarnished the public image of the ANC. This is evidenced in the declining support, especially in 2019, 2021 and 2024. Ironically, a significant decline happened under “The New Dawn”! Therefore, the answer to the last question is that the ANC will never succeed in ridding itself of the impact of corruption and trust deficit.

As the ANC prepares for the 2026 LGE, the National Disciplinary Committee must up its game by being factual and objective. Instances of corruption must end. The ANC must take the lead in ensuring that Madonsela’s recommendations are implemented. Should this not happen, questions will be asked if the money spent on this commission was justifiable! 

* Prof. Bheki Mngomezulu is Director of the Centre for the Advancement of Non-Racialism and Democracy at Nelson Mandela University.

** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL, Independent Media or The African.