UN peacekeeping troops on patrol in the eastern DRC. In today’s complex mediation landscape, marked by fragmentation and competition, the only way for the AU and the UN to retain some level of influence and advance solutions based on their principles is to tighten their cooperation, says the writer.
Image: AFP
El-Ghassim Wane
On 13-14 May 2025, Germany will host the 8th Ministerial Peacekeeping Conference in Berlin, with “The Future of Peacekeeping” as its overarching theme. This event, which will bring together the ministers of defence and foreign affairs from United Nations (UN) Member States, is part of the process launched after the 2015 Leaders’ Summit to strengthen support for UN Peacekeeping.
As African delegations prepare for the Berlin discussions, guided by the Independent Study on the ‘Future of Peacekeeping, New Models and Related Capabilities,’ they can bring valuable perspectives informed by direct experience with peacekeeping operations across the continent. Their contributions take on particular significance at this critical moment when peacekeeping faces renewed challenges to its relevance.
Three points are worth mentioning here.
First, peacekeeping works. Academic studies consistently demonstrate that it is a cost-effective way of reducing armed conflict and protecting lives. It also strengthens national sovereignty, not only because it accompanied decolonisation processes in the past, but also because it can ultimately help states recover the exercise of their basic functions. The real-world impact of peacekeeping is visible in Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia, which stand as compelling examples. Even in situations where there is no peace to keep, the positive impact of peacekeeping is evident.
Asserting that peacekeeping works is not to overlook its failures, and neither is it to overstate what it can achieve. Ultimately, missions operate under specific principles—consent of the parties, impartiality and restricted use of force—and their success primarily depends on the cooperation of host nations and conflict parties, as well as the support of the Security Council and the larger international community.
Second, UN and African Union (AU) operations are complementary pillars of a shared multilateral architecture. Neither institution should be viewed as a substitute for the other. The UN maintains significant comparative advantages, notably predictable financing, specialised expertise, and logistical capabilities. For its part, the AU has a demonstrated willingness to deploy missions in asymmetric environments. This also means that the successes and failures of UN and AU peace operations are interconnected.
Third, UN Peacekeeping is an embodiment of multilateralism in action. It brings together key constituencies and draws its strength from their consensus. The key role players here are the permanent and elected members of the UN Security Council, major financial contributors, host countries, and more than 120 countries, 40 of which are African, that have provided over two million uniformed peacekeepers to date.
Going forward, the AU and UN should devise practical ways to further strengthen their partnership.
As an immediate step, the two organisations should enhance their collaboration in support of ongoing UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. The UN missions can draw strength from the AU’s political legitimacy, while the continent is both the immediate beneficiary of successes and the most affected by failures. The UN should routinely share mission information with the AU to foster its proactive support (this should, of course, be bidirectional). At the Security Council level, the African members can rally more effective support for peacekeeping operations by taking principled stances, driven by the relevant AU normative frameworks, and by leading discussions on the challenges confronting missions. This approach can help ensure that issues are addressed on their own merits rather than being caught in the crossfire of current geopolitical tensions.
As the two organisations continue to work together to facilitate coordinated support to UN peacekeeping missions, they may also wish to consider the feasibility of systematically embedding AU liaison missions in UN operations. This would give the AU better insight into the unique role that UN peacekeeping plays and a deeper appreciation of its challenges.
Additionally, the AU and UN should jointly examine how to leverage the peacekeeping models identified in the study. This should involve assessing how the models could be used to address situations of shared concern and how they might serve as frameworks for mission initiation, expansion, or drawdown. The AU and the UN could then, through joint scenario planning exercises, test these models against hypothetical crises.
While the study focused on UN operations, it holds lessons for the AU, particularly regarding capabilities needed to enhance mission effectiveness, including planning, leadership, strategic communications, and rapid deployment capabilities. As the AU reviews its Standby Force, these priority areas could inform its modernisation efforts. Similarly, the AU and the UN could work together to examine how the former might utilise the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) to generate capabilities for its operations more effectively.
For peacekeeping to work more effectively, the AU and the UN need to step up their efforts towards peacemaking. This could entail the appointment of joint envoys as was done in the past, and the establishment of jointly led international contact groups or other similar structures. In today’s complex mediation landscape, marked by fragmentation and competition, the only way for the AU and the UN to retain some level of influence and advance solutions based on their principles is to tighten their cooperation.
In this context, the AU would benefit from striking a better balance between the various conflict management tools provided for in the Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol. It should effectively reinvest in prevention and peacemaking—areas where it possesses genuine comparative advantages. While peace support operations are necessary, they consume disproportionate organisational resources and attention. A recalibrated approach would maximise the AU’s impact across the conflict spectrum, while complementing UN efforts.
Finally, sustaining peacekeeping gains requires greater investment in structural prevention. The goal should be to effectively combine the AU’s rich framework on governance, democracy and human rights (here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here and here), on the one hand, and the UN technical and resource capacity, on the other. Such an enhanced partnership would focus on three areas: assistance to individual African countries to implement the commitments made based on the African instruments; support to relevant African institutions mandated to follow up various aspects of the continent’s governance and human rights agenda (here, here, here, here, here and here); and dissemination of the AU instruments to political, civil society and other actors to increase their level of awareness of the commitments entered into by their countries and foster greater accountability.
In a world defined by geopolitical tensions and facing heightened competition among various states, the Berlin Conference offers an opportunity to rally the broadest possible support for one of the most tested and enduring tools of multilateralism. For Africa, the stakes could not be higher. Given the asymmetric distribution of power between states and regions in the current international order, the multilateral system, for all its shortcomings, still offers the best way to advance the continent’s interests by enabling coalition-building and providing institutional platforms that can amplify Africa’s collective voice.
As African countries prepare for the Berlin Conference, it is worth recalling the July 1990 report on the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World and Their Implications for Africa, submitted by then OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim. While stressing that “the African response for the 1990s and beyond must […] be inward-looking, in that its major preoccupation [should] be to build Africa’s inner strength,” he also emphasised that the continent “must continue to court and nurture international solidarity.” In this respect, he urged that Africa must both strengthen its support for UN ideals and maintain the UN as the central focus of its multilateral diplomacy, recognising it as the continent’s most vital forum for advancing its interests.
Three and a half decades later, these words of wisdom remain relevant.
* El-Ghassim Wane led the team that conducted the independent study on the Future of Peacekeeping, New Models and Related Capabilities. He served as Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Mali and head of MINUSMA, and assumed several other responsibilities in both the UN and the AU, including UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping and Director for Peace and Security at the AU Commission.
** This article was originally published at https://www.accord.org.za/
*** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL, Independent Media or The African.