President Mahamat Idriss ‘Kaka’ Déby (pictured) took over the presidency in 2021 following the death of his father, Idris Déby Itno, who was killed on the battlefield fighting against FACT (Front pour l’alternance et la concorde au Tchad). – Picture: Présidence du Tchad
By Francesca Caruso
In early May, Chadians will head to the polls to elect their President after three years of military rule. Chad is one of several military governments that have seized power in West and Central Africa since 2020 and it is the first of these to organise elections. Interim President Mahamat Idriss Déby and Prime Minister Succés Masra are among the 10 candidates. A stable and peaceful Chad is key not only for Chadians but also for the Sahel and the Central African Republic (CAR).
The most significant aspect of these elections is, however, not the final result, but rather the extent to which the elected leadership will be able to navigate the complex political chessboard and continue the transition towards a more inclusive and democratic system. Both internal and regional tensions, especially those from Sudan, can influence the stability of Chadian politics.
President Mahamat Idriss ‘Kaka’ Déby took over the presidency in 2021 following the death of his father, Idris Déby Itno, who was killed on the battlefield fighting against FACT (Front pour l’alternance et la concorde au Tchad), one of the country’s biggest politico-armed groups based on the border with Libya. When President Mahamat Déby came to power in 2021, Chad was a country riddled with social and political tensions.
Despite some opponents referring to President Déby’s takeover as a coup (he immediately instituted a curfew, suspended the Constitution, and dissolved the National Assembly), there was hope for a new era, including among the armed groups.
After a few months, the President initiated a series of measures aimed at achieving national reconciliation, long-standing opposition figures in Chad – such as former Prime Minister Saleh Kebzabo – and those living abroad were offered official positions, and two national dialogues were launched.
The most significant aspect of these elections is, however, not the final result, but rather the extent to which the elected leadership will be able to navigate the complex political chessboard and continue the transition towards a more inclusive and democratic system.
Unfortunately, the results became controversial and, in some cases, diminished the hope that President Déby’s takeover inspired. In March 2022, a pre-dialogue between the government and 52 politico-armed groups was organised in Doha (Qatar) in order to agree on a ceasefire, the beginning of a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process and participation in the National and Sovereign Inclusive Dialogue (NSID).
However, after five months of discussion only 34 of 52 armed groups signed an agreement. The other 18, representing the largest armed groups (such as FACT, CCMSR & MPRD), did not sign the agreement on the grounds that they had not obtained the requested assurances, such as those concerning the release of their prisoners. They also alleged that the government was more interested in dividing them than in reconciliation.
The NSID took place in N’Djamena in September 2021, but several groups – such as Waki Tamma civil society group, the Catholic Church and a coalition of political parties called GCAP (Groupe de Concertation des Acteurs Politiques) – opposed the dialogue primarily due to the restricted scope of debate and lack of inclusivity among the participants, leading them to ultimately decide to boycott or withdraw.
Among the conclusions of the NSID was the decision to offer a two-year extension for President Déby, thus continuing his rule until 2024 and breaking his promise to transfer power to a civilian government after 18 months. This provoked popular demonstrations that took place in N’Djamena and in other towns on October 20, which resulted in the death of more than 120 people.
The protests on October 20 created a two-year crisis led mainly by Succés Masra, who was president of the opposition political party Les Transformateurs. Due to his activism during the protests, Masra was accused by the military for being responsible for the violence and was consequently forced to flee from Chad and seek temporary residence in the United States.
The October demonstrations, the pre-talks in Doha, the National Dialogue, along with the failure to reform the army, constituted a sequence of events that likely dashed the hopes of numerous Chadians who were optimistic about change in April 2021. However, although imperfect, there has been a timid but continual, transitional process in the last three years. For example, one sign of progress was the return to Chad, in January 2024, of Succès Masra who became Prime Minister.
Today Masra is running for the Presidential elections, a first time in the history of the country that a President and a Prime minister will be opponents at an election. On the other hand, in February 2024, a prominent figure, Yaya Dillo, was killed in N’Djamena after having tried to mobilise his supporters in the security services to overthrow the regime.
The crisis was short-lived, but it underlined the fact that there are continued internal tensions within the governance structure, especially among the Zaghawa community. The leadership elected in May will have to find a way to reduce these tensions to avoid the further escalation of internal conflicts along ethnic and tribal lines. This task, although difficult, is crucial as internal dynamics may lead some representatives of the various factions to seek alliances with the Zaghawa and the Arabs of Sudan and put pressure on N’Djamena.
An unstable Chad has the potential to be catastrophic not only for its people but also for the Sahel region and the neighbouring CAR.
The crisis in Sudan also represents a threat to Chad’s stability, as it is estimated that over 550,000 refugees from Darfur are continuing to cross the border and to settle in the Ouaddai region, which is an already economic and social fragile region. An unstable Chad has the potential to be catastrophic not only for its people but also for the Sahel region and the neighbouring CAR.
In the Sahel region, Chad played a historical role in the fight against Jihadism. Both armed groups and government are proud to consider their country as a kind of ligne maginot of Jihadism. With regard to CAR, a destabilised Chad would have an immediate effect on the country’s stability, which is progressively weakened by Sudan’s civil war in terms of refugees, loss of economic opportunities and insecurity.
Furthermore, rivalry between Russia, the United States, China, and the Gulf countries is increasingly destabilising the Sahel and Central African region. The more stable Chadian institutions will be, the less likely it is that they will be passing from one ‘master’ to another – as the President recently stated.
To avoid further instability in Chad and the region, the newly elected leadership should consolidate the small gains to date by pursuing its informal talks with the opposition groups, freeing political prisoners, focusing on the reform of the army to better reflect the country’s ethnic composition, and by implementing the DDR process with the signatories of the Doha Peace Agreement.
If the DDR process with the signatory groups is a success, then the non-signatories will be under pressure to sign the agreement and join the DDR process. The opposition groups seem ready for peace and the elected leadership – especially with Sudan in the grip of war – will have to focus on fostering national unity to address the country’s economic difficulties.
Francesca Caruso is an independent researcher focusing on Central African Peace and Security issues.
This article was published on ACCORD
