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Cyril Ramaphosa's Presidency: A Paradox of Reform and Failure

Clyde N.S. Ramalaine|Published

President Cyril Ramaphosa responding to the questions by MPs in Parliament, Cape Town on September 9.

Image: Siyabulela Duda / GCIS

Clyde N.S. Ramalaine

Cyril Matamela Ramaphosa ascended to the presidency in 2018 on a wave of expectation, at least for those who believed him to be the answer.

In rebuke of his predecessor, he coined the phrase “nine wasted years.” Introduced as a billionaire businessman who, in Gwede Mantashe’s words, would not steal from the poor, Ramaphosa was hailed as the face of the “New Dawn.” He would adopt Hugh Masekela’s Thuma Mina (“send me”) as his mantra, and many South Africans hoped for renewal.

Seven years later, that promise lies in fragments. Ramaphosa’s presidency is best understood as a paradox: reformist optics masking an entrenched unfitness to lead. His administration introduced policies aimed at stabilising the energy sector, reconstituting the tax authority, and reasserting South Africa on the global stage.

Yet these achievements are fatally undermined by manipulation, selective justice, corporate entanglements, and a presidency marked more by self-preservation than constitutional guardianship.

The Reformist Promise

To deny Ramaphosa’s positive interventions would be disingenuous.

  • Energy: He pushed through the long-delayed unbundling of Eskom, paving the way for generation, transmission, and distribution to be separated. He scrapped the 100MW cap, allowing private producers to feed directly into the grid. Loadshedding has not vanished, but it has receded from being a daily crisis to a less frequent reality.
  • Governance: He attempted to expand the Special Investigating Unit’s mandate.
  • He oversaw the long-delayed finalisation of the State Capture Commission under Raymond Zondo. For some, these efforts signalled a return to constitutional fidelity.

International relations

Ramaphosa has consciously sought to carve out a global role.

  • COVID-19: As AU chair in 2020, he championed vaccine equity and balanced BRICS ties with Western partnerships, briefly boosting investor confidence.
  • Ukraine: He led an African peace initiative urging negotiations, reflecting Africa’s commitment to non-alignment. Yet the initiative had little real impact.
  • Gaza: Most dramatically, his government lodged a case at the International Court of Justice accusing Israel of genocide. This raised South Africa’s profile but strained Western trade relations and sparked debate over whether it was principled human rights activism or a domestic political ploy.

These interventions demonstrate ambition. Yet while Ramaphosa projected reform abroad, he entrenched manipulation and concealment at home.

The Deeper Rot

The first sign that Ramaphosa’s reformism was hollow came earlier, at Marikana. As a Lonmin board member, he called striking mineworkers “criminals,” lobbying for “concomitant action” that ended with 34 dead. His refusal to accept moral responsibility foreshadowed a presidency where elite interests trump justice.

Corporate entanglements reveal Ramaphosa’s self-serving instincts, clinging to him like soiled diapers to an infant—inescapable, offensive, and impossible to ignore. His ties to Glencore implicated him in profiteering schemes that drained Eskom and crippled energy security. His involvement with MTN raised questions of illicit financing abroad. These legacies stain his presidency, undercutting his claims to ethical leadership.

The Phala Phala scandal, the undeclared foreign currency theft at his farm, exposed how institutions bend to shield him. What should have been a straightforward investigation into possible violations of exchange control, tax, and money-laundering laws spiralled into a maze of inquiries that produced exoneration rather than interrogation. Conveniently, this occurred while key ministers were on leave. Institutions designed to safeguard democracy became buffers for presidential survival, leaving a stench of impunity.

Equally damaging was his testimony in Parliament on the CR17 campaign. Despite assurances of transparency, investigative reports exposed undeclared flows linked to Bosasa. By presenting misleading accounts of his campaign finances, Ramaphosa not only deceived legislators but entrenched the patronage he condemned. Judge Dunstan Mlambo’s sealing of the CR17 records, followed by his promotion, cemented suspicions of judicial co-option.

The mismanagement and ultimately unaccounting of R500 billion in COVID-19 relief funds is perhaps the most brutal indictment. Auditor-General reports highlighted systemic failures, yet prosecutions remain absent. Funds meant for the poor became another monument to Ramaphosa’s failure to protect accountability.

Economically, Ramaphosa has presided over disaster. Under President Cyril Ramaphosa, South Africa’s labour market has deteriorated, revealing a stark failure of economic leadership. As of June 2025, the official unemployment rate stood at 33.2%, with the expanded rate, including discouraged work-seekers, reaching 42.9%. Youth unemployment has soared to 62.2%, while graduate unemployment sits at 11.7%.

Despite convening two high-profile Job Summits to address these challenges, tangible outcomes remain minimal, highlighting Ramaphosa’s inability to translate political authority into sustainable employment. If economic reform is measured by the creation of meaningful work, Ramaphosa’s record exposes him as profoundly unfit to steer South Africa toward growth and inclusion.

As economist Duma Gqubule notes, unemployment has reached record highs: 12.6 million unemployed in 2025, including 1.1 million graduates. Youth unemployment stands at 71.7%, with African women at 51.4%. While the labour force grew by 419,000, only 155,000 jobs were created, exposing the emptiness of his job summits and rhetoric.

While Ramaphosa positioned himself as the moral arbiter of state capture, using it as a rhetorical cudgel against his predecessor, his inaction in addressing the very networks of corruption exposed by the Zondo Commission remains one of the most glaring evidence of his unfitness to lead.

By retaining implicated individuals within his cabinet and inner circle, Ramaphosa transformed state capture from a constitutional crisis into a political instrument, a mechanism to secure his rise to power rather than a mandate to enforce accountability. The selective targeting of political rivals while shielding allies signals that, for Ramaphosa, state capture was never about justice or institutional restoration; it was about consolidating personal and factional advantage, leaving the systemic rot that the Commission revealed largely unaddressed.

Cabinet management reflects the same rot. The bloating of ministries, the questionable appointment of Firoz Cachalia as Acting Minister of Police, and Senzo Mchunu’s indefinite leave reveal a presidency more concerned with loyalty than integrity. Interference in operational policing, including the recall of 121 politically sensitive dockets, underscores the dangerous nexus of politicians, police, and criminal syndicates under Ramaphosa’s watch.

Another indicator of Ramaphosa’s unfitness lies in the judiciary’s complicity in showing a selective appetite for justice. In the MKP rightful case, the Constitutional Court deferred critical questions about his appointment of Cachalia, the legality of the Madlanga Commission, and Mchunu’s contested leave, sidestepping accountability. This contrasts sharply with the Zuma case, where the same Court handed down a 15-month jail sentence for contempt with unprecedented severity.

The disparity is glaring: one president punished beyond precedent, another protected through avoidance. Judicial selectivity entrenches Ramaphosa’s insulation, corroding confidence in the courts and legitimising selective justice. When accountability depends on who occupies the Union Buildings, democracy collapses into a managed oligarchy.

Between Rhetoric and Reality

The paradox of Ramaphosa’s presidency lies in his polished ability to cloak manipulation in reformist language. Yes, Eskom reforms were introduced, yet his ties to Glencore remain unexamined. Yes, SARS was rebuilt, yet the NPA was neutered, reduced to an instrument of selective justice. Yes, South Africa regained some international standing, yet domestically, Parliament was obstructed and institutions repurposed to shield him.

The Democratic Alliance, calculating that a weakened ANC under Ramaphosa serves its interests, has failed to hold him accountable. Civil society, dazzled by surface reforms, too often ignores the deeper capture at play, from CR17 secrecy and Phala Phala obfuscation to the disappearance of COVID-19 funds.

The Verdict: A Reformist Unfit to Lead

What then do we make of Cyril Ramaphosa? His defenders point to energy reforms, institutional rebuilding, and foreign policy stances. His critics highlight Marikana, Phala Phala, CR17 secrecy, Bosasa, COVID-19 funds, and policing interference. Both are true. Yet when weighed together, the record is damning. His contributions, while real, cannot outweigh his sustained subversion of accountability and the rot of self-preservation he normalised.

A president who lies to Parliament, conceals corporate entanglements, manipulates oversight, and enables criminal-political networks cannot claim moral legitimacy. South Africa does not need a reformer in appearance but a constitutionalist in substance. Ramaphosa has shown he is not that leader. His tenure reveals not the redemption of democracy but its vulgarised capture under a new guise.

The time has come to break with illusion. Cyril Ramaphosa, despite his carefully packaged reforms, is unfit to lead South Africa. His removal is not merely desirable but imperative, for the preservation of constitutional integrity, the restoration of public trust, and the safeguarding of the Republic’s democratic future.

* Clyde N.S. Ramalaine is a theologian, political analyst, lifelong social and economic justice activist, published author, poet, and freelance writer.

** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL, Independent Media or The African.