Organised Crime: Capture of Political Elite Subverting the Rule of Law

Dr. Reneva Fourie

The Madlanga Commission, now in its eighth day, is increasingly uncovering the intricate intersections between organised crime, commercial interests, political violence, and interference in governance.

Testimony by the head of Crime Intelligence, Lt-Gen. Dumisani Khumalo, has brought particular attention to a prominent cartel identified as the Big 5. In his evidence, Khumalo characterised organised crime as a growing and serious threat to South Africa’s national security and economic stability. He emphasised that the cartel’s reach extends across local and international spheres, forming an extensive web that has penetrated political structures.

Khumalo described the group’s principal commodity as the international trafficking of illicit drugs, accompanied by practices that include contracted killings, cross-border vehicle hijackings, kidnappings, tender manipulation, and extortion. He guided the commission through the history of the Political Killings Task Team (PKTT).

He explained the nature of organised crime to provide context for the eventual disbandment of the PKTT. His testimony underscored the operational sophistication of such networks and their ability to couple lucrative criminal economies with violence, enabling them to exert influence over public life.

The evidence presented included WhatsApp messages retrieved from the mobile devices of Matlala, a central figure in the alleged cartel. These exchanges, involving members of the police, business leaders, and political figures, reportedly illustrate how information and influence were acquired through direct payment.

This insight reveals not only the methods of the syndicate but also the vulnerability of state institutions when access, protection, and decision-making can be commodified. The convergence undermines the constitutional order, compromises public security, and erodes the legitimacy of governance.

History indicates that such entanglements between political authority and organised criminality are neither new nor unique to the country. The story of Pablo Escobar and the Medellín Cartel illustrates this dynamic. Escobar’s power rested not only on violence and cocaine profits but on his ability to buy influence in political circles.

His brief stint in Colombian politics was not an aberration. It was a strategy. By wearing the garb of legitimacy, he shielded his criminal empire from scrutiny. The tragedy of Colombia during those years shows what happens when the line between political authority and organised crime becomes blurred. The results were assassinations, widespread corruption, and the erosion of democratic institutions.

The work "Italian Mafias Today: Territory, Business, and Politics " demonstrates the sophisticated integration between the legal economy, entrenched control over territory, and the symbiotic relationships between criminal networks, political parties, and state institutions.

The book illustrates how criminal entities infiltrate democratic systems, masquerading as legitimate economic actors while exploiting every loophole for profit. The lessons from Italy are sobering. Once such networks are entrenched, they are extraordinarily difficult to dismantle.

Europol’s assessments on contemporary mafias underline the global scope of the threat. Cosa Nostra money launderers are among the most dexterous financial operators in the world. They construct elaborate corporate structures that manoeuvre themselves into national economies. Their reach extends to South Africa, Canada, Spain, and the United States.

The ’Ndrangheta is even more widely diffused, with a presence across Europe, North America, South America, and Australia. Europol concludes that all major mafia groups cultivate a parasitic relationship with the state. They infiltrate political systems and economic sectors with devastating effectiveness. They thrive on weaknesses in regulation, fragmented enforcement, and political complicity.

In The Rise and Fall of Organized Crime in the United States, James B Jacobs details the complex relationships between the Cosa Nostra and various groups, including businesspeople, politicians, law enforcement agencies, and civil servants. The narrative is one of complicity, where individuals within state systems choose to prioritise their own interests over upholding the rule of law.

The history of organised crime in the United States reveals a cycle that is recognisable in other countries. When politicians become dependent on illicit funds and state officials become complicit in wrongdoing, the system itself becomes corrupted.

The Epstein case, still unfolding, provides a contemporary example. Investigations have revealed that high-profile politicians were linked to extensive use of offshore companies, nominee accounts, and complex financial arrangements. These arrangements could have been used for money laundering, for hiding payments, and possibly for sex trafficking.

While the case is distinct from traditional mafia structures, the methods are familiar. Networks of secrecy, financial manipulation, and political influence create spaces where criminality can thrive with impunity.

South Africa’s history shows that these patterns are not new. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission revealed the existence of Delta G. This structure was set up by the apartheid Special Operations unit with the express purpose of supplying illegal drugs in an attempt to counter anti-apartheid activism. The collaboration with criminal networks to distribute drugs as a political weapon was devastating to communities, and their traces remain visible today.

More recently, the Zondo Commission provided significant insights into public sector corruption. It demonstrated how procurement systems and state-owned entities were manipulated for the enrichment of a few. But the Madlanga Commission is highlighting even deeper links between criminal networks, the state, and the economy.

While the veracity of the allegations still needs to be tested, it appears that an internal malaise has taken root in the body politic. The experiences of Colombia and Italy and the global spread of such criminal networks offer a mirror of what lies ahead if the threat is not confronted. The consequences would be the normalisation of violence, the erosion of public trust, and the hollowing out of democracy until it exists only in name.

What is urgently needed is clean governance. Clean governance is not an abstract ideal. It is the lifeblood of democracy. It is the guarantee that resources are used for the benefit of the people. It is the assurance that the police will serve communities rather than protect criminal syndicates.

It is the promise that public representatives will uphold the Constitution and not the interests of clandestine networks. Clean governance requires integrity, transparency, and accountability in every sphere of government.

A harsher fight against crime and corruption is equally necessary. This fight must be relentless. It must involve strengthening investigative capacity, protecting whistle-blowers, reforming procurement processes, and ensuring that prosecutions are swift and decisive. It requires collaboration between state institutions, civil society, and international partners. 

The path forward is one of integrity and resilience. Without clean governance and a resolute offensive against crime and corruption, the promise of democracy risks becoming hostage to those who profit from its betrayal.

* Dr Reneva Fourie is a policy analyst specialising in governance, development, and security.

** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL, Independent Media or The African.